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Abstract
Randomness extractors, widely used in classical and quantum cryptography and other fields of com-
puter science, e.g., derandomization, are functions which generate almost uniform randomness from weak
sources of randomness. In the quantum setting one must take into account the quantum side information
held by an adversary which might be used to break the security of the extractor. In the case of seeded
extractors the presence of quantum side information has been extensively studied. For multi-source
extractors one can easily see that high conditional min-entropy is not sufficient to guarantee security
against arbitrary side information, even in the classical case. Hence, the interesting question is under
which models of (both quantum and classical) side information multi-source extractors remain secure.
In this work we suggest a natural model of side information, which we call the Markov model, and prove
that any multi-source extractor remains secure in the presence of quantum side information of this type
(albeit with weaker parameters). This improves on previous results in which more restricted models were
considered or the security of only some types of extractors was shown.
1 Introduction
Randomness extractors are of great importance in many applications in computer science, such as derandom-
ization and cryptography. The goal of a randomness extractor is to generate (almost) uniform randomness
from weak sources of randomness. A weak source is usually modelled as a distribution X over {0, 1}n such
that the min-entropy of X is lower bounded by k: Hmin(X) ≥ k. That is, the source is defined via a prob-
ability distribution for which the probability of any string x ∈ {0, 1}n is at most 2−k. The idea is then to
apply a randomness extractor to the weak source, such that the output source Y is indistinguishable from a
uniformly random source.
Unfortunately, no deterministic function can extract the randomness from all sources with a given min-
entropy, even for sources with high min-entropy [SV86, Sha02]. The most common ways to avoid this problem
are to consider seeded extractors and multi-source extractors. In the case of seeded extractors one uses an
additional truly uniform (but short) and independent seed, together with the weak source, as the input to
the extractor (see, e.g., [ILL89, Tre01, Sha02]).
Alternatively, and of special importance in applications where a uniform seed is not available (e.g.,
in quantum randomness amplification protocols, see Section 7), multi-source randomness extractors can be
used. In the multi-source case, instead of starting with one weak source X , one considers several independent
weak sources X1, X2, . . . , Xl for some l ≥ 2, with Hmin(Xi) ≥ ki for i ∈ [l], as the input to the extractor
(see, for example, [Vaz87, DEOR04, Raz05, Rao09, CZ15]).
In all types of extractors the randomness present in the weak sources must be lower bounded for the ex-
tractor to work (i.e., a bound on the min-entropy is given as a promise). However, this randomness inherently
depends on the information one has about the weak sources, or to put differently, on the side information
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about the sources. For example, extractors are widely used for privacy amplification in cryptographic tasks.
There, the starting point is that an adversary holds some side information C about the source such that the
conditional min-entropy is bounded: Hmin(X |C) ≥ k. The extractor is then used to transform X to a key
Y , which should be close to uniform even conditioned on the side information C. If the extractor fulfils this
requirement it is said to be secure.
Depending on the application one can consider adversaries with classical or quantum side information and
ask whether an extractor remains secure even in the presence of such side information (with slightly weaker
parameters). For seeded extractors this question has been extensively studied. In the presence of classical
adversaries the side information aboutX can be translated to a decrease in the min-entropy and the extractor
remains secure [KT08]. In the quantum case, it was further shown in [KT08] that all one-bit output extractors
remain secure. It is still unknown whether all multi-bit output extractors remain secure (although the results
of [BFS14, BFS16] go in this direction1), but several constructions of seeded extractors with good parameters
were shown to work also in the presence of quantum side information [RK05, TSSR11, DPVR12, HT15].
When considering multi-source extractors things get more complicated, even in the classical case. To see
this, consider any one-bit output two-source extractor and let the adversary hold as side information the
output of the extractor Y = Ext (X1, X2). As this is just one bit, Hmin (X1|Y ) ≥ k1− 1 and Hmin (X2|Y ) ≥
k2 − 1. Furthermore, as the sources are independent even Hmin (X1|Y X2) and Hmin (X2|Y X1) remain
high. Nevertheless, the extractor obviously fails to produce an output which looks uniform given the side
information. In [KK10] several more examples are given in which a small amount of classical side information
breaks the extractor completely.
This implies that one cannot expect to have multi-source extractors which are secure against any classical
or quantum side information and thus raises the question: under which assumptions on the structure of the
sources and the side information X1· · ·XlC do multi-source extractors remain secure even in the presence
of C? The main objective of this work is to answer this question. In particular, we define a natural condition
on the sources and the side information for which all multi-source extractors remain secure in the presence of
both classical and quantum side information, but with an increase in the error of the extractor—the distance
from uniform of the output.
1.1 Results and contributions
Our first contribution is a new definition of a quantum-proof multi-source extractor, which is simpler than
previous proposals [KK10, CLW14] and yet sufficient to extract from these models. The original classical
extractor definition requires the sources to be independent, i.e., in the two-source case one must have I(X1 :
X2) = 0, where I(· : ·) denotes the mutual information. If an adversary is present and holds some side
information C, the definition we introduce requires that the two sources be independent from the point
of view of this adversary, i.e., I(X1 : X2|C) = 0. This definition is valid for both classical and quantum
side information C. This means that the sources and the side information should form a Markov chain
X1 ↔ C ↔ X2. For the case of more than two sources a similar Markov-type condition can be defined and
we say that the sources and the side information are in the Markov model. The formal definitions are given
in Section 3.
Compared to previous definitions of quantum-proof multi-source extractors, this has several advantages.
Firstly, it is a natural generalization of the original classical extractor definition and the extension to quantum
side information from [KK10], and it connects to the model of [CLW14] in the following sense: any function
satisfying our definition of a strong2 extractor is also an extractor in the model of [CLW14]—a more precise
comparison to previous work is given in Section 1.2. Secondly, we consider it much more natural to put
a requirement on the structure of the global state ρX1X2C , instead of describing permissible adversarial
strategies that generate the side information C, as in [KK10, CLW14]. Thirdly, Markov chains arise naturally
in certain applications. For example, in realisations of quantum randomness amplification protocols one can
1Note that there is no contradiction between the results of [BFS14, BFS16] and the famous counter example of a seeded
extractor which breaks in the presence of quantum side information given in [GKK+07]; for details see [BFS14, BFS16].
2An extractor is said to be strong in a set of its sources if even conditioned on all the sources in this set the output cannot
be distinguished from uniform (see formal definition in Section 3).
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sometimes assume that the devices on which the experiment is being preformed have a Markov chain structure
(for further details see Section 7).
We also show that extractors in the Markov model can be used to extract randomness from a larger set of
states. We prove that a bound on the smooth min-entropy [Ren08] suffices for randomness extraction. This
can be seen as a robustness property of the model, since in many applications one can only bound the smooth
min-entropy rather than the min-entropy itself. In addition, we prove that any CPTP map performed on the
side information—which might delete information and thus destroy the Markov property—cannot decrease
the security of an extractor, hence extractors in the Markov model are also extractors for such non-Markov
states3.
Our second contribution is to prove that all extractors (weak and strong) remain secure in this model,
both in the classical and quantum case, albeit with weaker parameters. In the classical case the proof is
pretty trivial and standard (and the result is indeed not surprising). Nevertheless, as we could not find it
anywhere else in the literature, we give it in this work for completeness and as comparison to the quantum
case. More specifically, for classical side information we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Any (k1, . . . , kl, ε)-[strong] l-source extractor is a
(
k1 + log
1
ε , . . . , kl + log
1
ε , (l + 1)ε
)
-[strong]
classical-proof l-source extractor in the Markov model.
The formal definitions of a (strong) l-source extractor and a (strong) classical-proof l-source extractor are
given in Section 3.1. The important thing to note is that for the extractor to remain secure, the min-entropy
of the sources needs to be just log 1ε higher, where ε is the security parameter (or the error) of the extractor.
This is exactly the same as in the case of seeded extractors [KT08] with classical side information.
The main contribution of the current work is the quantum version of the theorem above:
Theorem 2. Any (k1, . . . , kl, ε)-[strong] l-source extractor is a
(
k1 + log
1
ε , . . . , kl + log
1
ε ,
√
(l + 1)ε2(m−2)
)
-
[strong] quantum-proof l-source extractor in the Markov model, where m is the output length of the extractor.
The formal definitions of the extractors are given in Section 3.2. As in the classical case, the min-entropy
of the sources needs to be just log 1ε higher. The error itself is
√
(l + 1)ε2(m−2) where l is the number of
sources and m is the number of output bits of the considered extractor4.
Although the blow-up in the error of the extractor in Theorem 2 might seem relatively high, one must
note that many classical multi-source extractors have an error ε = 2−mc for some constant c > 1, hence
in the quantum case the new error is ε′ =
√
l+1
2 2
−m c−12 , i.e., both the classical and quantum errors are of
the order 2−Ω(m). We provide several explicit constructions in Section 6, where we show how to achieve
similar parameters to the classical case, even if ε ≫ 2−m, by composing the multi-source extractor with a
quantum-proof seeded extractor.
Apart from presenting the Markov model for extractors and proving the theorems above, we also con-
tribute on the technical level. While previous works use the techniques of [KT08] for the one-bit output
case and then extend it using a quantum XOR lemma [KK10], we use a completely different proof technique
which is based on the recent work of [BFS14, BFS16]. The advantage of our technique is that it also applies
to weak extractors, whereas the techniques of [CLW14] require the extractors to be strong in order to prove
that they are secure. We extend on our proof technique in Section 1.3.
1.2 Related work
As far as we are aware, the question of the security of multi-source extractors in the presence of side
information was considered only in two works: [KK10] and [CLW14]. Both works deal with quantum side
information, and classical side information can of course be taken as a special case. We are not aware of any
works dealing with the case of classical side information directly.
3This includes, in particular, states constructed according to the model of [CLW14].
4This matches exactly the bound proven in [KK10, Corollary 27] for the restricted case of product side information, l = 2,
and m = 1. We note that this is also an improvement over the constructions in the model of [CLW14], for which the error
in [CLW14, Theorem 5.3] for l = 2 is of the form 2m
√
ε, i.e., an order of
√
2m worse than ours.
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[KK10] initiated the study of multi-source extractors in the presence of side information. They considered
the case of two sources and quantum side information in product form. More specifically, given the two
independent sourcesX1 andX2, the side information is given by a state ρC1⊗ρC2 such thatHmin(Xi|C1C2) =
Hmin(Xi|Ci) ≥ ki. In this way, the side information does not break the independence of the sources5. It was
proven in [KK10] that any one-bit output two-source extractor remains secure in the presence of product
side information. They further show that a specific construction of a multi-bit output two-source extractor,
that of [DEOR04], is also secure in the considered model, by reducing it to the one-bit case.
Recently, another, more general model for an adversary was considered in [CLW14]. For simplicity, we
explain here the model for the case of two sources only; see [CLW14] for the general definition. In [CLW14]
the side information of the adversary must be created in the following way: in the beginning the adversary
can have any bipartite quantum state ρE1E2 , independent of the sources. Then, to create her final side
information ρC1C2 , she can correlate her state with the sources by performing an independent “leaking
operation” from each source to one of the subsystems. More specifically, they model the leaking operation as
a map for i ∈ {1, 2}, Φi : L(Xi⊗Ei)→ L(Xi⊗Ci). The resulting classical-quantum state ρX1X2C1C2 can be
written as ρX1X2C1C2 = Φ1 ⊗ Φ2(ρX1X2E1E2). For the relevant conditions on the min-entropy see [CLW14].
It was then proven in [CLW14] that for multi-source extractors which are strong in all but one source, this
complex adversarial leaking operation is in fact equivalent to providing the adversary with side information
about only one source. That is, when using an extractor which is strong in all but one of its sources, any
adversary who is restricted to the model of [CLW14] is in fact no stronger than an adversary who has side
information about just one source. It is further shown that several known extractor constructions are still
secure when the adversary holds quantum side information about one of the sources—with an increase in
the error of the extractor. The leaking model of [CLW14] can also be defined for weak extractors. However,
the proof techniques of [CLW14] only work for strong extractors, since they rely on the equivalence to side
information about one source. Thus, there are currently no known extractor constructions that directly
satisfy the weak extractor model from [CLW14], without relying on an underlying strong extractor.
Our work is a natural generalization of [KK10], since independent sources are a subset of Markov sources.
The model from [CLW14] is different from ours in the sense that there exist states ρX1X2C which are Markov
chains but cannot be constructed by the leaking model from [CLW14] and vice versa. However, as already
proven in [CLW14], for a function to satisfy their strong extractor definition, it is sufficient for it to be
secure in the presence of side information about one of the sources. Since side information about one source
is a Markov chain, it follows that any strong extractor in the Markov model is also a strong extractor in
the leaking model of [CLW14]—for completeness, we provide a proof of this in Section 5.2. It is currently
unknown whether the same statement holds for weak extractors. Interestingly, the converse statement also
holds: we (implicitly) prove in this work that any function that is an extractor for side information in product
form is an extractor in the Markov model with slightly weaker parameters. Since the leaking model from
[CLW14] includes states in product from, an extractor from [CLW14] is also an extractor in the Markov
model with slightly weaker parameters.
1.3 Proof outline and techniques
The proof of the classical result, i.e., Theorem 1, is quite standard. The main part of this work is therefore
devoted to the quantum case—the proof of Theorem 2. The main idea is to not consider the most general
measurement that could be performed to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform, but instead
consider a specific strategy, which consists in first measuring the quantum side information, then trying
to distinguish the output from uniform given the resulting classical side information. We first prove that
this specific strategy is not much worse than the optimal strategy. Then we show that this classical side
information satisfies the requirements of a classical two-source extractor in the Markov model. Thus, security
in the quantum case follows from security in the classical case.
More specifically, the proof can be decomposed in the following steps.
5[KK10] also considered another model for the adversary, called the bounded storage model, in which an assumption is made
on the size of the adversary’s storage capacity. In this work we consider only the more general case, in which we make no
assumption about the adversary’s power. For more details see [KK10].
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1. We start by considering only product side information in Section 4.1. We employ ideas from [BFS14,
BFS16], where the security definition of the extractor is rewritten using operators inequalities, to give
a bound in Lemma 12 on the distance from uniform of the extractor output.
2. Next (in Lemmas 13 and 14) we simplify the bound by noting that it can be seen as a specific simple
distinguishing strategy when trying to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform using the
side information. This specific strategy is one in which the product side information is measured
independently of the output of the extractor (while a general distinguisher could use more complicated
distinguishing strategies). Hence we obtain a reduction from quantum to classical side information.
3. We put this together in Lemma 15, to show that any multi-source extractor is secure in the presence
of product side information6.
4. Finally, in Section 4.2, we extend the result from the product model to the quantum Markov model by
exploiting the structure of quantum Markov-chain states, and by this prove that Theorem 2 holds.
Organisation of the paper. The rest of paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give some necessary
preliminaries. Section 3 is devoted to the definitions of classical and quantum-proof multi-source extractors
in the Markov model. The proof of our main theorem, Theorem 2, is then given in Section 4. In Section 5
we show that multi-source extractors in the Markov model can be used to extract from some sources that do
not directly satisfy the definition. In Section 6 we give the parameters of explicit constructions of quantum
multi-source extractors, i.e., we apply our results to some specific constructions of multi-source extractors.
In Section 7 we further motivate the Markov model in the context of quantum randomness amplification
protocols. We conclude in Section 8 with some open questions.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with standard notation in probability theory as well as with basic concepts in quantum
information theory including density matrices, positive-operator valued measures (POVMs), and distance
measures such as the trace distance. We refer to, e.g., [NC10] for an introduction to quantum information.
Throughout the paper X,Y and Z denote classical random variables while A,B and C denote quantum
systems. All logarithms are in base 2. [l] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , l} and for i ∈ [l] we denote i¯ =
1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , l.
If a classical random variable X takes the value x with probability px it can be written as the quantum
state ρX =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|, where {|x〉}x is an orthonormal basis. If the classical systemX is part of a composite
system XC, any state of that composite system can be written as ρXC =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|⊗ρxC . If C is quantum
we say that the state ρXC is a classical-quantum state, or a cq-state. Similarly, a state ρX1X2C classical on
X1, X2 and quantum on C is called a ccq-state. For two independent random variables X and Y we often
write X ◦ Y to denote the joint random variable with product distribution.
For a quantum state ρA we denote byH(A) the Von Neumann entropy of ρA, i.e., H(A) = −Tr(ρA log ρA).
The conditional mutual information is defined as
I(A : B|C) = H(AC) +H(BC)−H(C)−H(ABC) .
In the case of classical systems, the Von Neumann entropy is reduced to the Shannon entropy. That is, for
a random variable X , H(X) = −∑x px log px, where px is the probability of X = x.
Given a cq-state ρXC =
∑
x px|x〉〈x|⊗ρxC the conditional min-entropy is Hmin(X |C) = − log pguess(X |C),
where pguess(X |C) is the maximum probability of guessing X given the quantum system C. That is,
pguess(X |C) = max{Ex
C
}x
(∑
x
pxTr(E
x
Cρ
x
C)
)
,
6This can be seen as an extension of the result of [KK10] but the proof is different.
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where the maximum is taken over all POVMs {ExC}x on C. For an empty system C, the conditional min-
entropy of X given C reduces to the usual Hmin(X) = − logmaxx px. Furthermore, if a quantum system C
is measured and the measurement outcome is registered in the classical system Z then the min-entropy can
only increase, namely, Hmin(X |Z) ≥ Hmin(X |C).
3 Multi-source extractors
3.1 Multi-source extractors in the presence of classical side information
Two-source extractors are defined as follows. The extension of the definition to the case of more than two
sources is straightforward.
Definition 3 (Two-source extractor, [Raz05]). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m is called
a (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor if for any two independent sources X1, X2 with Hmin (X1) ≥ k1 and
Hmin (X2) ≥ k2, we have
1
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)− Um‖ ≤ ε ,
where Um is a perfectly uniform random variable on m-bit strings. Ext is said to be strong in the i’th input
if
1
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)Xi − Um ◦Xi‖ ≤ ε .
If Ext is not strong in any of its inputs it is said to be weak.
As explained in Section 1, in the classical case one can also consider the security of the extractor in the
presence of classical side information, denoted by Z, held by an adversary. That is, we would like the output
of the extractor to be indistinguishable from uniform also given some additional classical information.
Since multi-source extractors cannot remain secure in the presence of an arbitrary classical side informa-
tion (recall the examples presented in Section 1), we require the sources to be independent conditioned on
the side information. Formally:
Definition 4 (Classical Markov model). The random variables X1, X2 and Z are said to form a Markov
chain, denoted by X1 ↔ Z ↔ X2, if
I(X1 : X2|Z) = 0 .
For more than two sources X1, . . . , Xl and side information Z, we say that they are in the Markov model if
∀i ∈ [l], I(Xi : Xi¯|Z) = 0 .
To see that I(X1 : X2|Z) = 0 indeed captures the idea that conditioned on Z the sources are independent,
note that I(X1 : X2|Z) = 0 if and only if p(x1, x2|z) = p(x1|z) · p(x2|z) for all x1, x2 and z.
We can now define classical-proof multi-source extractors in the following way. For simplicity, we give
the definition in the case of two sources; the extension to more than two sources in the Markov model is
straightforward.
Definition 5 (Classical-proof two-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m is a
(k1, k2, ε) classical-proof two-source extractor secure in the Markov model, if for all sources X1, X2, and clas-
sical side information Z, whereX1 ↔ Z ↔ X2 form a Markov chain, and with min-entropyHmin (X1|Z) ≥ k1
and Hmin (X2|Z) ≥ k2, we have
1
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)Z − Um ◦ Z‖ ≤ ε , (1)
where Um is a perfectly uniform random variable on m-bit strings. Ext is said to be strong in the i’th input
if
1
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)XiZ − Um ◦XiZ‖ ≤ ε . (2)
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Indeed, if one requires that the sources and the side information Z fulfil Definition 4 then all multi-source
extractors remain secure also in the presence of the side information Z. This is proven in the following
lemma for two sources.
Lemma 6. Any (k1, k2, ε)-[strong] two-source extractor is a (k1+log
1
ε , k2+log
1
ε , 3ε)-[strong] classical-proof
two-source extractor in the Markov model.
Proof. Let X1 ↔ Z ↔ X2 be such that Hmin (X1|Z) ≥ k1 + log 1ε and Hmin (X2|Z) ≥ k2 + log 1ε . For any
two classical systems X and Z, we have
2−Hmin(X|Z) = E
z←Z
[
2−Hmin(X|Z=z)
]
,
so by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
z←Z
[Hmin (X |Z = z) ≤ Hmin (X |Z)− log 1/ε] ≤ ε .
Applying this to bothX1 andX2, we have that with probability at least 1−2ε (over Z), Hmin (X1|Z = z) ≥ k1
and Hmin (X2|Z = z) ≥ k2. Due to the Markov-chain condition, the distributions X1|Z=z and X2|Z=z are
independent. Hence for any (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor Ext,
1
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)Z − Um ◦ Z‖ = 1
2
∑
z
PZ(z)‖Ext(X1|Z=z, X2|Z=z)− Um‖ ≤ 3ε .
For a strong extractor the proof is identical.
By following the same steps as the proof of Lemma 6 for the case of l sources we get Theorem 1.
3.2 Multi-source extractors in the presence of quantum side information
We now consider multi-source extractors in the presence of quantum side information, i.e., in the following C
denotes a quantum system. Similarly to Section 3.1 we restrict the sources and the quantum side information
to the quantum Markov model. Formally,
Definition 7 (Quantum Markov model). A ccq-state ρX1X2C is said to form a Markov chain
7, denoted by
X1 ↔ C ↔ X2, if
I(X1 : X2|C) = 0 .
For more than two sources X1, . . . , Xl and C we say that they are in the Markov model if
∀i ∈ [l], I(Xi : Xi¯|C) = 0 .
The following is then the natural analog of Definition 5 to the quantum setting. The extension to the
case of more than two sources is straightforward.
Definition 8 (Quantum-proof two-source extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m is a
(k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model, if for all sources X1, X2, and quantum
side information C, where X1 ↔ C ↔ X2 form a Markov chain, and with min-entropy Hmin (X1|C) ≥ k1
and Hmin (X2|C) ≥ k2, we have
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ ε , (3)
where ρExt(X1,X2)C = Ext⊗ 1CρX1X2C and ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2m. Ext
is said to be strong in the i’th input if
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ ρXiC‖ ≤ ε . (4)
7The same definition is also used in the more general case where also the Xi’s are quantum. For our purpose the case of
classical sources and quantum side information is sufficient.
7
If C above is classical then Definition 8 is reduced to Definition 5.
The interesting question is therefore whether there exist quantum-proof multi-source extractors. The
main contribution of this work is to show that any multi-source extractor is also a quantum-proof multi-
source extractor in the Markov model with a bit weaker parameters. The formal statement is given in
Theorem 2 above and proven in the following section.
4 Security of multi-source extractors in the quantumMarkov model
For simplicity, in this section we prove that two-source extractors are secure even when considering quantum
side information in the form of a Markov chain. The extension to any number of sources, i.e., the proof of
Theorem 2, follows by trivially repeating the same steps for more than two sources and using our definition
of the Markov model (Definition 7). More specifically, the goal of this section is to prove the following:
Lemma 9. Any (k1, k2, ε)-[strong] two-source extractor is a
(
k1 + log
1
ε , k2 + log
1
ε ,
√
3ε · 2(m−2)
)
-[strong]
quantum-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model, where m is the output length of the extractor.
To prove this, we first show in Section 4.1 that all extractors are still secure in the case of side information
in product from. Then in Section 4.2 we generalise this result to any side information in the Markov model.
4.1 Product quantum side information
We start by showing that any two-source extractor, as in Definition 3, is secure against product quantum
side information. The product extractor as defined below is a special case of the extractor in Definition 8:
Definition 10 (Quantum-proof product two-source extractor, [KK10]). A function Ext : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n2 →
{0, 1}m is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof product two-source extractor, if for all sources X1, X2, and quan-
tum side information C, where ρX1X1C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 , and with min-entropy Hmin (X1|C1) ≥ k1 and
Hmin (X2|C2) ≥ k2, we have
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ ε , (5)
where ρExt(X1,X2)C = Ext⊗ 1CρX1X2C and ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2m. Ext
is said to be strong in the i’th input if
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ ρXiCi ⊗ ρCi¯‖ ≤ ε . (6)
In the following we show that any two-source extractor remains secure in the product model, i.e., if the
quantum state of the sources and the side information is of the form ρX1X2C = ρX1C1⊗ρX2C2 (see Corollary 16
below for the formal statement). This can be seen as an extension of the results of [KK10], where only two-
source extractors with one-bit output (i.e., m = 1 in our notation) and the extractor of [DEOR04] were
shown to be secure against product quantum side information.
The first step of the proof uses the fact that any ccq-state ρX1X2C can be obtained by performing local
measurements on a pure state ρABC . We formalise this in the following lemma. The proof of the lemma is
trivial and given in Appendix A.
Lemma 11. Let ρX1X2C =
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ |x2〉〈x2|ρC(x1, x2). Then there exists a pure state ρABC and
POVMs {Fx1}, {Gx2} such that
ρC(x1, x2) = TrAB
[
F
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1CρABCF
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1C
]
. (7)
The following three lemmas are proven for the case of weak extractors. The lemmas and proofs for the
strong case are very similar and therefore given in Appendix B. We start with the next lemma where the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality is used, as in [BFS14, BFS16].
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Lemma 12. Let ρX1X2C be any ccq-state, and let ρABC and {Fx1}, {Gx2} satisfy Equation (7). Then there
exists an alternative purification of ρAB, namely ΨABC1C2 , and two POVMs {Hz1}, {Kz2} acting on C1 and
C2, such that
1
M
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖2 ≤∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(z1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ] ,
where M = 2m and m is the output length of the extractor. Moreover, if the state ρAB is of tensor product
form, the purification ΨABC1C2 also factorises into a tensor product between AC1 and BC2.
Proof. First, recall that for a hermitian matrix R we have ‖R‖ = max{Tr[RS] : −1 ≤ S ≤ 1}. Applying
this to the matrix whose norm specifies the error of the extractor, we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ = max−1≤S≤1Tr
[(
ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC
)
S
]
.
Since ρExt(X1,X2)C and ρUm ⊗ ρC are block diagonal with respect to the outcome variable of the extractor
y, S can be assumed to be block diagonal as well. Using this and inserting the expression for ρX1X2C in
Equation (7) we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ = max−1≤Sy≤1
∑
y
Tr [ρABC∆y ⊗ Sy] ,
where we used the abbreviation
∆y =
∑
x1,x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Fx1 ⊗Gx2 .
We now choose a special purification of ρAB, namely we consider the pretty good purification [Win04]
|ψ〉ABA′B′ = ρ
1
2
AB ⊗ 1A′B′ |ΦAA′〉|ΦBB′〉 ,
where |Φ〉AA′ =
∑
a |aa〉 denotes the unnormalised maximally entangled state. Since both |ψ〉ABA′B′ and
ρABC are purifications of ρAB there exists an isometry V : A
′B′ → C such that V |ψ〉〈ψ|V ∗ = ρABC and
hence
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ max−1≤Sy≤1
∑
y
Tr [|ψ〉〈ψ|∆y ⊗ Sy] ,
since V ∗SyV is bounded in norm by one and hermitian. Inserting the identity 1⊗XA′ |ΦAA′〉 = XTA′⊗1|ΦAA′〉
for any matrix X (where (.)T denotes the transpose in the basis of the maximally entangled state), we find
Tr [|ψ〉〈ψ|∆y ⊗ Sy] = Tr
[
ρ
1
2
AB∆yρ
1
2
AB(Sy)
T
]
. (8)
The crucial observation is now that the sesquilinear form (Ry) × (Sy) 7→
∑
y Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABR
∗
yρ
1
2
ABSy
]
on block-
diagonal matrices is positive semi-definite and hence fulfils the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Applying this
gives
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖2 ≤
(∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
AB∆yρ
1
2
AB∆y
])(∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABSyρ
1
2
ABSy
])
.
Since we have that the norm of Sy is bounded by one, the terms in the second sum satisfies
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABSyρ
1
2
ABSy
]
≤ Tr
[
ρ
1
2
ABSyρ
1
2
AB
]
≤ Tr [ρAB] = 1 ,
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and we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖2 ≤M
∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
AB∆yρ
1
2
AB∆y
]
.
Inserting the definition of ∆y and reversing the identity leading to Equation (8) proves the assertion with
C1 = A
′, C2 = B′, ΨABC1C2 = |ψ〉〈ψ| and Hz1 = FTz1 , Kz2 = GTz2 .
The upper bound of the preceding lemma can be further simplified (the proof is given in Appendix A):
Lemma 13. For any ΨABC1C2 and positive operators {Fx1}, {Gx2}, {Hz1}, {Kz2} which sum up to the
identity,
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(z1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]
=
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]−
1
M
(9)
The quantity in Equation (9) can be seen as a simple distinguishing strategy of a distinguisher trying
to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform given classical side information. We can therefore
relate it to the error of the extractor in the case of classical side information, i.e., to Equation (1). This is
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 14. For i ∈ {1, 2} let Zi denote the classical side information about the source Xi such that
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]. Then∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2)− 1
M
≤ 1
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ .
Proof. Define the following random variables over {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2:
R = Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2 ; Q = Um ◦ Z1Z2 .
Let A⋆ = {(a1, a2, a3)∣∣a1 = Ext (a2, a3)} ⊆ {0, 1}m×{0, 1}n1 ×{0, 1}n2. Then, the probabilities that R and
Q assign to the event A⋆ are
R(A⋆) =
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) ; Q(A⋆) = 1
M
Using the definition of the variational distance we therefore have
1
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ = sup
A
‖R(A)−Q(A)‖
≥ R(A⋆)−Q(A⋆)
=
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2)− 1
M
.
Finally, we combine the lemmas together to show that any weak classical-proof two-source extractor in
the Markov model is secure against product quantum side information as well.
Lemma 15. Any (k1, k2, ε) classical-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model is a
(
k1, k2,
√
ε · 2(m−2)
)
quantum-proof product two-source extractor, where m is the output length of the extractor.
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Proof. For any state of two classical sources and product side information ρX1X2C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 with
Hmin(X1|C) ≥ k1 and Hmin(X2|C) ≥ k2, let ρABC and {Fx1}, {Gx2} be the state and measurements satis-
fying Equation (7).
We can now apply Lemmas 12, 13, and 14 to get the bound
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤
√
M
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ , (10)
where Z1, Z2 are defined via p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2], for ΨABC1C2 which is
constructed in the proof of Lemma 12.
As ΨABC1C2 = ΨAC1 ⊗ΨBC2 and the measurements are all in tensor product we have p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
p(x1, z1) · p(x2, z2), which implies:
1. The sources and the classical side information form a Markov chain X1 ↔ Z1Z2 ↔ X2.
2. Hmin (Xi|Z1Z2) = Hmin (Xi|Zi) ≥ Hmin (Xi|Ci) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Hence, if Hmin (Xi|Ci) ≥ ki then by the definition of a classical-proof two-source extractor,
1
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)Z1Z2 − Um ◦ Z1Z2‖ ≤ ε . (11)
Combining Equations (10) and (11) we get
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤
1
2
√
Mε =
√
ε2(m−2) .
By combining Lemma 6 together with Lemma 15 (Lemma 36 in Appendix B) for the weak (strong) case
we get that any weak (strong) two-source extractor is also secure against product quantum side information.
The bound given in Corollary 16 matches exactly the bound given in [KK10] for the special case of m = 1
(see [KK10, Corollary 27]).
Corollary 16. Any (k1, k2, ε)-[strong] two-source extractor is a
(
k1 + log
1
ε , k2 + log
1
ε ,
√
3ε · 2(m−2)
)
−
[strong] quantum-proof product two-source extractor, where m is the output length of the extractor.
4.2 Extending to the Markov model
We now extend the result of Section 4.1 to the case of the more general Markov model. To do so, we first
recall that by the result of [HJPW04], Markov states (according to Definition 7) can also be written in the
form
ρA1A2C =
⊕
t
p(t)ρtA1Ct1
⊗ ρtA2Ct2 , (12)
where the index t runs over a finite alphabet T , p(t) is a probability distribution on that alphabet, HC =⊕
tHCt1 ⊗HCt2 is the Hilbert space of C, and ρtAiCti denote states on AiC
t
i , i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let ρX1X2C be a Markov state (as in Definition 7) such that Hmin (Xi|C) ≥ ki + log 1ε .
We first deal with the case of weak extractors. Using the decomposition from Equation (12) we can reduce
the problem to the product case by writing
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ =
∑
t
p(t)‖Ext⊗ 1C
(
ρtX1Ct1
⊗ ρtX2Ct2
)
− ρUm ⊗ ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
‖ .
From Equation (10) we thus have
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤
∑
t
p(t)
√
M
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2|T = t− Um ◦ Z1Z2|T = t‖
≤
√
M
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)Z1Z2T − Um ◦ Z1Z2T ‖ ,
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where in the last line we used Jensen’s inequality and Z1, Z2 are defined via
p(x1, x2, z1, z2|t) = Tr
[
ρtABCF
t
x1 ⊗Gtx2 ⊗Htz1 ⊗Ktz2
]
.
That is, Z1 and Z2 are derived from C in the following way: from Equation (12) the states {ρtCt1 ⊗ ρ
t
Ct2
}t are
orthogonal, hence there exists an isometry C → CT which maps∑t p(t)ρtCt1⊗ρtCt2 to∑t p(t)ρtCt1⊗ρtCt2⊗|t〉〈t|.
The state ρtCt1
⊗ ρtCt2 is then measured in the same way as in Lemma 15 for the product case to get the side
information Z1Z2|T . Hence, the structure X1 ↔ Z1Z2T ↔ X2 is conserved. Furthermore, we also have
Hmin (Xi|Z1Z2T ) ≥ ki + log 1ε . Using these two conditions, the problem has been reduced to one with
classical side information in the Markov model. Using the fact that Ext is a (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor
and applying Lemma 6 we conclude the proof for weak extractors.
Similarly, for strong extractors, from Equation (16) we have
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
∑
t
p(t)
√
M
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2|T = t− Um ◦X1Z2|T = t‖
≤
√
M
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2T − Um ◦X1Z2T ‖ .
Again, we can see this as a measurement made on C such that the value of T is measured and then a further
measurements of Ct2 is done in the same way as for the product case to get the side information about X2
(while there is no additional side information about X1). Hence, as in the weak case, X1 ↔ Z2T ↔ X2 and
Hmin (Xi|Z2T ) ≥ ki + log 1ε , so the problem has been reduced to the classical case.
In the case of l sources, a state ρX[l]C that satisfies the Markov model (Definition 7) can be written as
ρX[l]C =
⊕
t
p(t)ρtX1Ct1
⊗ · · · ⊗ ρtXlCtl . (13)
We provide a proof of this in Appendix A as Lemma 32. It follows from Equation (13) that Lemma 9 can
be easily generalised to l sources.
5 Extending the set of extractable sources
Although the definition of a quantum-proof two-source extractors (Definition 8) requires the source ρX1EX2
to be a Markov chain with a bound on the min-entropy, a function proven be such an extractor can also
be used to extract randomness from a larger set of sources, e.g., if the adversary were to destroy her side
information E, this would not hinder extraction, yet it could destroy the Markov chain property of the source.
In this section we consider two extensions of the multi-source extractor definition for which all multi-source
extractors in the Markov model can be used. In Section 5.1 we show that it is not necessary to have a
bound on the min-entropy, it is sufficient to bound the smooth min-entropy of the sources X1 and X2. Then
in Section 5.2 we show that one can also extract from any source obtained by deleting information from a
Markov source, even though the resulting state might not be a Markov chain any longer. The multi-source
extractor model for strong extractors from [CLW14] falls in this category.
5.1 Smooth min-entropy
It is standard for the extractor definitions to require a bound on the min-entropy of the source conditioned
on the side information, i.e., Hmin(Xi|C) ≥ ki. In practical situations, however, one often only has a
bound on the smooth min-entropy—this is defined by maximising the min-entropy over all states δ-close,
see Equation (14) below. For example, in quantum key distribution a bound on the smooth min-entropy
is obtained by sampling the noise on the quantum channel [TLGR12]. In this section we prove that any
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quantum-proof two-source extractor can be used in a context where only a bound on the smooth min-entropy
is known.
The smooth conditional min-entropy with smoothness parameter δ of a state ρXC is defined as follows.
Hδmin(X |C)ρ = max
σ∈Bδ(ρ)
Hmin(X |C)σ, (14)
where Bδ(ρ) is a ball of radius δ around ρXC . This ball is defined as the set of subnormalized states σ with
P (ρ, σ) ≤ δ, where P (·, ·) is the purified distance [TCR10]. The exact definition of the purified distance is
not needed in this paper, so we omit it for simplicity and refer the interested reader to [TCR10]. The only
property of the purified distance that we need in this work is that for any (subnormalized) ρ and σ,
P (ρ, σ) ≥ 1
2
‖ρ− σ‖.
This means that if Hδmin(X |C)ρ ≥ k, then there exists a subnormalized σXC such that 12‖ρ − σ‖ ≤ δ and
Hmin(X |C)σ ≥ k.
We can now state our main lemma. This can be generalised to the multi-source case in a straightforward
manner.
Lemma 17. Let Ext : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m be a (k1− log 1/ε1−1, k2− log 1/ε2−1, ε) quantum-proof
two-source extractor in the Markov model. Then for any Markov state ρX1X2C with H
δ1
min
(X1|C)ρ ≥ k1 and
Hδ2
min
(X2|C)ρ ≥ k2,
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ ≤ 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 2ε
if the extractor is weak, and
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ ρXiC‖ ≤ 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 2ε
if the extractor is strong in the source Xi.
To prove that Lemma 17 holds, we first need to prove that if a state ρX1X2C is guaranteed to be a Markov
state with bounded smooth min-entropy, then there is a (subnormalized) state σX1X2C close by which is also
a Markov state with a bound on the min-entropy. This can be seen as a robustness property of the Markov
model for extractors.
Lemma 18. Let ρX1X2C be a Markov state X1 ↔ C ↔ X2 such that Hδ1min(X1|C)ρ ≥ k1 and Hδ2min(X2|C)ρ ≥
k2. Then there exists a subnormalized state σX1X2C such that X1, X2 and C still form a Markov chain
X1 ↔ C ↔ X2, and Hmin(X1|C)σ ≥ k1−log 1ε1 , Hmin(X2|C)σ ≥ k2−log 1ε2 and 12‖ρ−σ‖ ≤ ε1+ε2+3δ1+3δ2.
Proof. By the Markov chain condition, the state ρX1X2C can equivalently be written
ρX1C1ZE2X2 =
∑
x1,x2,z
p(z)p(x1|z)p(x2|z)|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ ρx1,zC1 ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
⊗ |x2〉〈x2|.
Thus Hδ1min(X1|C)ρ = Hδ1min(X1|C1Z)ρ and Hδ2min(X2|C)ρ = Hδ2min(X2|C2Z)ρ. In the following we use only
this form with the explicit classical register Z.
By the definition of smooth min-entropy, we know that there exist (subnormalized) states
σ˜X1C1Z =
∑
x1,z
q1(z)q(x1|z)|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ σx1,zC1 ⊗ |z〉〈z|
and σˆX2C2Z =
∑
x2,z
q2(z)q(x2|z)|x2〉〈x2| ⊗ σx2,zC2 ⊗ |z〉〈z|
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such that 12‖ρX1C1Z−σ˜X1C1Z‖ ≤ δ1, 12‖ρX2C2Z−σˆX2C2Z‖ ≤ δ2, Hmin(X1|C1Z)σ˜ ≥ k1 andHmin(X2|C2Z)σˆ ≥
k2.
Since 2−Hmin(X1|CZ)σ =
∑
z q(z)2
−Hmin(X1|CZ=z)σ also for subnormalized distributions q(·), we can de-
fine 2−Hmin(X1|CZ=z)σ := 0 when q(z) = 0, then pad q(·) to get a normalized distribution for which
2−Hmin(X1|CZ)σ = Ez
[
2−Hmin(X1|CZ=z)σ
]
. We can thus use Markov’s inequality and get
Pr
z←Z
[
Hmin(X1|C1Z = z)σ˜ ≤ k1 − log 1
ε1
]
≤ ε1
and Pr
z←Z
[
Hmin(X2|C2Z = z)σˆ ≤ k2 − log 1
ε2
]
≤ ε2 .
Let Z1 and Z2 be the sets of values for which q1(z1) 6= 0, q2(z2) 6= 0, and
∀z1 ∈ Z1, Hmin(X1|C1Z = z1)σ˜ ≥ k1 − log 1
ε1
and ∀z2 ∈ Z2, Hmin(X2|C2Z = z2)σˆ ≥ k2 − log 1
ε2
.
Let Z¯ := Z1 ∩ Z2 be their intersection, and let p¯(z) be a subnormalized distribution given by
p¯(z) :=
{
p(z) if z ∈ Z¯,
0 otherwise.
We define the (subnormalized) state
σX1C1ZC2X2 :=
∑
x,y,z
p¯(z)q(x1|z)q(x2|z)|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ σx1,zC1 ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ σ
x2,z
C2
⊗ |x2〉〈x2|,
and prove in the following that it satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
By construction of σ we have 2−Hmin(X1|C1Z)σ =
∑
z p¯(z)2
−Hmin(X1|C1Z=z)σ for values z such that
Hmin(X1|C1Z = z)σ ≥ k1 − log 1ε1 . Hence Hmin(X1|C1Z)σ ≥ k1 − log 1ε1 and similarly Hmin(X2|C2Z)σ ≥
k2 − log 1ε2 .
To bound the distance from ρX1C1ZC2X2 , first note that
1
2
∑
z
|p¯(z)− p(z)| ≤ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2.
We also have
∑
x1,z
p(z)
2
‖p(x1|z)ρx1,zC1 − q(x1|z)σ
x1,z
C1
‖ ≤
∑
x1,z
1
2
‖p(z)p(x1|z)ρx1,zC1 − q1(z)q(x1|z)σ
x1,z
C1
‖+ 1
2
‖q1(z)q(x1|z)σx1,zC1 − p(z)q(x1|z)σ
x1,z
C1
‖ ≤ 2δ1.
The same holds for X2C2Z, namely
∑
x2,z
p(z)
2
‖p(x2|z)ρx2,zC2 − q(x2|z)σ
x2,z
C2
‖ ≤ 2δ2.
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Putting this together we get
1
2
‖ρX1C1ZC2X2 − σX1C1ZC2X2‖
=
∑
x,y,z
1
2
‖p(z)p(x1|z)p(x2|z)ρx1,zC1 ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
− p¯(z)q(x1|z)q(x2|z)σx1,zC1 ⊗ σ
x2,z
C2
‖
=
∑
x,y,z
p(z)
2
‖p(x1|z)p(x2|z)ρx1,zC1 ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
− q(x1|z)q(x2|z)σx1,zC1 ⊗ σ
x2,z
C2
‖+ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2
≤
∑
x,y,z
p(z)
2
‖p(x1|z)p(x2|z)ρx1,zC1 ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
− q(x1|z)p(x2|z)σx1,zC1 ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
‖
+
p(z)
2
‖q(x1|z)p(x2|z)σx1,zC1 ⊗ ρ
x2,z
C2
− q(x1|z)q(x2|z)σx1,zC1 ⊗ σ
x2,z
C2
‖+ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2
=
∑
x1,z
p(z)
2
‖p(x1|z)ρx1,zC1 − q(x1|z)σ
x1,z
C1
‖+
∑
x2,z
p(z)
2
‖p(x2|z)ρx2,zC2 − q(x2|z)σ
x2,z
C2
‖+ ε1 + ε2 + δ1 + δ2
≤ ε1 + ε2 + 3δ1 + 3δ2.
Since Lemma 18 finds a subnormalized state that is close, the next step is to prove that one can extract
from subnormalized states. This is done in Appendix C in Lemma 37. Combining this with a simple use of
the triangle inequality allows us to prove Lemma 17.
Proof of Lemma 17. We prove the case of a weak extractor Ext. The proof for a strong extractor is identical.
By Lemma 18 there exists a subnormalized Markov state σX1X2C such that
1
2‖ρX1X2C − σX1X2C‖ ≤
ε1 + ε2 + 3δ1 + 3δ2 and Hmin(Xi|C)σ ≥ ki − log 1/εi. Hence
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − σExt(X1,X2)C‖+
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖+
1
2
‖ρUm ⊗ σC − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖
≤ 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 6δ1 + 6δ2 + 2ε ,
where in the last line we used Lemma 37.
5.2 Non-Markov sources
It is trivial to show that if part of the side information E is deleted, this cannot decrease the security of
an extractor. As already observed in [CLW14], in the case of an extractor that is strong in the source Xi,
any operation on E conditioned on Xi cannot help an adversary either. Intuitively, this holds because the
adversary is given the entire source Xi, thus copying information about it to E is pointless. We formalize
this in the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Let ρX1EX2 be a Markov source with Hmin(Xi|E)ρ ≥ ki. Let E : L(E) → L(E) be any CPTP
map on E. If Ext is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof two-source extractor, then it can be used to extract from
σX1EX2 = E(ρX1EX2) with error ε. Let E : L(XiE) → L(XiE) be a CPTP map that leaves Xi unmodified,
i.e., E(∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE) = ∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ Ex(ρxE) for some set of CPTP maps Ex : L(HE) → L(HE). If
Ext is a (k1, k2, ε) quantum-proof two-source extractor strong in Xi, then it can be used to extract from
σX1EX2 = E(ρX1EX2) with error ε.
Proof. We prove the case of the strong extractor. The proof for the weak extractor follows the same steps.
We need to show that
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)XiE − ρUm ⊗ σXiE‖ ≤ ε .
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This follows from the contractivity of the trace distance and because the maps Ext and E commute:
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)XiE − ρUm ⊗ σXiE‖ =
1
2
‖E(ρExt(X1,X2)XiE)− ρUm ⊗ E(σXiE)‖
≤ 1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)XiE − ρUm ⊗ ρXiE‖ ≤ ε .
An equivalent result in [CLW14, Theorem 4.1] allows the authors to prove that their complex information
leaking model can be reduced to side information about one of the sources, which implies that a strong
extractor in the Markov model is also an extractor in the model of [CLW14]. Note that, as already observed
in [CLW14], the entropy of the state σX1EX2 is not meaningful, since the operation E might delete information
without reducing the capacity to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform. One has to measure
the entropy on the Markov state before E is applied [CLW14].
6 Explicit constructions
In this section we give some examples for explicit constructions of quantum-proof multi-source extractors in
the Markov model, as follows from our main theorem, Theorem 2.
In Section 6.1 we consider a two-source extractor by Dodis et al. [DEOR04]. This extractor requires
the sum of the entropies in both sources to be larger than n, and we get a construction with nearly iden-
tical parameters in the quantum case. In Section 6.2 we consider a two-source extractor construction by
Raz [Raz05], which requires one source to have entropy at least n/2, whereas the other can be logarithmic.
Here too, the resulting quantum-proof extractor has nearly identical parameters to the classical case. In
Section 6.3 we look at a three source extractor by Li [Li15c], which only requires the sources to have entropy
poly-logarithmic in n. Plugging this in our main theorem allows a sublinear amount of entropy to be ex-
tracted in the quantum case, and by combining it with Trevisan’s extractor [DPVR12], we can extract the
remaining entropy and thus obtain the same output length as in the classical case. The final construction we
analyse in Section 6.4 is based on a recent two-source extractor by Li [Li15a], which only needs two sources of
poly-logarithmic min-entropy. Unfortunately, the error is n−Ω(1), which means that Theorem 2 only allows
Ω(logn) bits to be extracted. Composing this with another variant of Trevisan’s extractor [DPVR12] allows
a sublinear amount of randomness to be extracted at the cost of requiring one of the sources to have k = nα
bits of entropy for any constant α < 1.
Since the works of Dodis et al. [DEOR04] and Raz [Raz05] provide the exact parameters for their extrac-
tors, we do the same here below in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. In contrast, for the two extractors from [Li15c, Li15a]
the exact parameters are unknown, as only the simplified O-notation form is given in the corresponding pa-
pers. For this reason the constructions in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 are also given in O-notation.
6.1 High entropy sources
The first extractor we consider is a strong two-source extractor from Dodis et al. [DEOR04], which requires
both sources together to have at least n bits of entropy.
Lemma 20 ([DEOR04]). For any n1 = n2 = n, k1, k2 and m there exists an explicit function Ext :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k1, k2, ε) two-source extractor, strong in both X1 and in X2 (separately),
with ε = 2−(k1+k2+1−n−m)/2.
To have an error ε < 1, the total entropy must be k1 + k2 > n− 1. The difference between k1 + k2 and
n− 1 can either be extracted or used to decrease the error. Let ℓ +m = k1 + k2 + 1 − n, then the error is
ε = 2−ℓ/2.
Plugging Lemma 20 into Theorem 2 we get the following.
Corollary 21. For any n1 = n2 = n, k
′
1, k
′
2 and m there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k′1, k′2, ε) two-source extractor, strong in both sources (separately), with ε′ =√
3
2 2
−(k′1+k′2+1−n−5m)/8.
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Proof. From Theorem 2 we have k′1 = k1+ log
1
ε and k
′
2 = k2+ log
1
ε . Rewriting the error from Lemma 20 in
terms ofm we getm = k1+k2+1−n−2 log 1ε . Hence m = k′1+k′2+1−n−4 log 1ε , so ε = 2−(k
′
1+k
′
2+1−n−m)/4.
Plugging this in the error from Theorem 2, namely ε′ =
√
3ε2m/2 finishes the proof.
The parameters in the quantum case are very similar to the classical one. We still need k′1+k
′
2 > n−1 and
the difference can either be extracted or used to decrease the error. But this time for ℓ+ m˜ = k′1+k
′
2+1−n
the extractor outputs m = m˜/5 bits with error 2−ℓ/8.
Since the extractor is strong we can compose it with a quantum-proof seeded extractor, e.g., Trevisan’s
extractor [DPVR12], to extractor more randomness from the sources—this procedure is explained in Ap-
pendix D. Here we use a variant of Trevisan’s extractor with parameters given in Lemma 39 in Appendix D.
Corollary 22. For any n1 = n2 = n, k
′
1, k
′
2, ε
′, m′′, ε′′, such that
m =
k′1 + k
′
2 + 1− n− 8 log(
√
3/2ε′)
5
≥ d ,
max[k′1, k
′
2] ≥ m′′ + 4 log
m′′
ε′′
+ 6 ,
where d is the seed length needed by the extractor from Lemma 39, there exists an explicit function Ext :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+m′′ that is a quantum-proof (k′1, k′2, ε′ + ε′′) two-source extractor.
We remark that the construction of Dodis et al. [DEOR04] is based on universal hash functions. These
are already known to be good quantum-proof seeded extractors [RK05, TSSR11, HT15]. Recently, Hayashi
and Tsurumaru [HT15] proved that they are also good quantum-proof extractors if the seed is not uniform.
Using some of our proof techniques, the result of Hayashi and Tsurumaru can be generalised to obtain a
different proof that the construction of Dodis et al. is a two-source extractor in the Markov model. The
resulting parameters are better than what we obtain here with the generic reduction from quantum-proof to
classical extractors, since the Hayashi-Tsurumaru proof [HT15] does not have the
√
2m factor.
6.2 One high and one logarithmic entropy source
The following construction by Raz [Raz05] improves on Dodis et al. [DEOR04]. One of the sources still
requires at least n/2 bits of entropy, but the other can be logarithmic.
Lemma 23 ([Raz05, Theorem 1]). For any n1, n2, k1, k2, m, and any 0 < δ < 1/2, such that,
n1 ≥ 6 logn1 + 2 logn2,
k1 ≥
(
1
2
+ δ
)
n1 + 3 logn1 + logn2,
k2 ≥ 5 log(n1 − k1),
m ≤ δmin
[
n1
8
,
k2
40
]
− 1,
there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m that is a (k1, k2, ε)-two-source extractor
strong in both inputs (separately) with ε = 2−3m/2.
Plugging this into Theorem 2 we get the following.
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Corollary 24. For any n1, n2, k
′
1, k
′
2, m, and 0 < δ
′ < 19/32, such that,
n1 ≥ 6 logn1 + 2 logn2,
k′1 ≥
(
1
2
+ δ′
)
n1 + 3 logn1 + logn2,
k′2 ≥
163
32
log
((
1 +
3δ′
19
)
n1 − k′1
)
,
m ≤ 16δ
′
19
min
[
n1
8
,
4k′2
163
]
− 1,
there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m that is a quantum-proof (k′1, k′2, ε)-two-
source extractor strong in both inputs (separately) with ε′ =
√
3
2 2
−m/4.
Proof. We need k′1 ≥ k1 + log 1/ε, so we set
k′1 = k1 +
3
2
δ
n1
8
≥
(
1
2
+
19δ
16
)
n1 + 3 logn1 + logn2.
We obtain the bound on k′1 given above by setting δ
′ = 19δ/16. Similarly, we need k′2 ≥ k2 + log 1/ε, so we
set
k′2 = k2 +
3
2
1
2
k2
40
=
163
160
k2 ≥ 163
32
log(n1 − k1).
Writing this in terms of k′1 instead of k1 gives the bound on k
′
2. The bound on m is also updated in terms
of δ′ and k′2. Finally the new error is given by ε
′ =
√
3ε2m/2.
Here too the parameters are very similar to the classical case, only the coefficients change somewhat. As
in Section 6.1, this extractor is strong, hence we can compose it with Lemma 39 as explained in Appendix D.
Corollary 25. For any n1, n2, k
′
1, k
′
2, m, and 0 < δ
′ < 19/32, satisfying the constraints from Corollary 24
and any m′′, ε′′ such that
m ≥ d(m′′, ε′′) ,
max[k′1, k
′
2] ≥ m′′ + 4 log
m′′
ε′′
+ 6 ,
where d—the seed length needed by the extractor from Lemma 39—is a function of m′′ and ε′′, there exists
an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+m′′ that is a quantum-proof (k′1, k′2,
√
3
2 2
−m/4 + ε′′)
two-source extractor.
6.3 Three poly-logarithmic sources
The third extractor we consider can break the barrier of n/2 min-entropy—it is sufficient for the sources to
have k = log12 n bits of entropy—but requires three sources instead of two.
Lemma 26 ([Li15c, Theorem 1.5]). For any n and k ≥ log12 n, there exists an explicit function Ext :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k, k, k, ε) three-source extractor, strong in X1 and in X2X3
with m = 0.9k and ε = 2−k
Ω(1)
.
Since the error of this extractor is not exponential in k, but only in kc for some c < 1, when applying it
to a source with quantum side information we cannot extract all of the entropy, but only kc
′
bits, for any
c′ < c.
Corollary 27. For any n and k′ ≥ 2 log12 n, there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′ that is a quantum-proof (k′, k′, k′, ε′) three-source extractor, strong in X1 and in X2X3
with m′ = k′Ω(1) and ε′ = 2−k
′Ω(1)
.
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Proof. Let c be the leading term in Ω(1) for ε = 2−k
Ω(1)
from Lemma 26. Note that we necessarily have
c < 1, because otherwise for k = n the error would be 2−n+o(n) which is impossible [RTS00]. We thus get
k′ = k + log 1/ε = k + kc + o(kc). Requiring k′ ≥ 2 log12 n is sufficient to have k ≥ log12 n for large enough
k. Picking m′ = kc
′
= k′Ω(1) for some c′ < c implies that ε′ =
√
4ε2m/2 = 2−k
Ω(1)
= 2−k
′Ω(1)
.
Corollary 27 does not extract as much entropy as Lemma 26, but it extracts enough to use as a seed in
Trevisan’s construction and extract the entropy of the sources X2X3. The parameters below are obtained
by composing Corollary 27 with Lemma 40.
Corollary 28. There exists a constant c′ such that for any n and k3 ≥ k2 ≥ k1 ≥ max
[
2 log12 n, log3/c
′
n
]
,
there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a quantum-proof
(k1, k2, k3, ε) three-source extractor with m = k
Ω(1)
1 + k2 + k3 − o(k2 + k3) and ε = n−Ω(1).
Proof. The quantum-proof extractor from Lemma 40 requires a seed of length d = O(log3 n) for an error
ε = n−Ω(1). The output length of Corollary 27 is m′ = kc
′
1 −o(kc
′
1 ) for some constant c
′. Thus, if kc
′
1 > log
3 n,
the output is long enough.
6.4 Two poly-logarithmic sources
In a recent breakthrough Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman constructed a two-source extractor that outputs 1
bit and only requires two sources of poly-logarithmic entropy [CZ15]. This was then generalised to multiple
output bits by Li [Li15a].
Lemma 29 ([Li15a, Theorem 1.3]). There exists a constant c1 such that for any n and k ≥ logc1 n, there
exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m that is a (k, k, ε) two-source extractor strong in
X2 with m = k
Ω(1) and ε = n−Ω(1).
Since the error of this extractor is only polynomial in 1/n, the quantum-proof version can only produce
an output of length m′ = Ω(log n). The constant hidden in m = Ω(logn) depends on the constant in
ε = n−Ω(1). However, Lemma 29 allows the error to be n−c2 for any constant c2 [Li15b], which means that
m′ = c3 logn for any c3.
Corollary 30. There exists a constant c′1 such that for any n and k
′ ≥ logc′1 n, there exists an explicit
function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′ that is a quantum-proof (k′, k′, ε′) two-source extractor strong in
X2 with ε
′ = n−Ω(1) and m′ = c3 logn for any constant c3 > 0 and sufficiently large n.
Proof. Since for Lemma 29 we have ε = n−c2 for any c2, we setm′ = c22 logn, hence ε
′ =
√
3ε2m′/2 = n−Ω(1).
The difference between k′ and k is absorbed in the constant c′1.
This extractor is strong in the second input, hence as previously we can extract the entropy of this source
using Trevisan’s extractor. However, since the output is only m′ = c3 logn, we compose it with a variant
of Trevisan’s extractor that only needs a seed of length O(log n), but requires the source to have entropy
k = nα for some constant 0 < α ≤ 1 and extracts kβ bits for any 0 < β < 1. This extractor is given in
Lemma 41. The result given here below allows one of the sources to still have poly-logarithmic entropy, but
requires the other to have k = nα bits of min-entropy.
Corollary 31. There exists a constant c′1 such that for any 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < β < 1, n, k1 ≥ logc
′
1 n
and k2 ≥ nα there exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m′′ that is a quantum-proof
(k1, k2, ε
′′) two-source extractor with ε′′ = n−Ω(1) and m′′ = kβ2 .
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7 The quantum Markov model in quantum randomness amplifi-
cation protocols
Recently, the interest in quantum-proof two-source extractors (and multi-source in general) was renewed as
people wished to use them as part of quantum randomness amplification (QRA) protocols. As for randomness
extractors, the goal of a QRA protocol is to extract an almost uniformly random string from a weak source
(which is usually known in public, e.g., NIST’s Randomness Beacon). However, in contrast to randomness
extractors, the idea is to do it with only one weak source (and no seed) by exploiting the power of quantum
physics (as mentioned in Section 1 this is impossible in the case of randomness extractors). Of course, once
a quantum protocol is considered, it only makes sense to consider quantum side information.
With particular importance are QRA protocols which are device independent. That is, protocols in which
one treats the devices as black boxes and does not assume much regarding the underlying quantum states
and measurements inside the boxes8. One should then prove the security of the protocol only based on the
statistics which are observed by the honest user when running the protocol. This seemly impossible task is
made possible by the use of Bell inequalities, which allow one to “certify the quantumness” of the considered
protocol (for a review on the topic see, e.g., [Sca13]).
In the past couple of years several protocols were suggested for this task. The result presented in [CSW14]
was a big breakthrough: they considered a QRA protocol which uses a polynomial (at best) number of devices
and a security proof against a general quantum adversary was proven. The main disadvantage of the protocol
given in [CSW14] for actual implementations is the number of devices; each device can be thought of as a
separate computer (or actually a complete laboratory where a Bell violation experiment can be done) and
for the protocol to work one must make sure that the different computers cannot send signals to one another.
Hence, a large number of devices amounts to a huge impractical apparatus. It is therefore interesting to
ask whether a QRA protocol with a constant number of devices exists, or under which assumptions on the
devices it is possible to devise such a protocol which can also be implemented in practice.
Several other works considered the question of QRA with a constant number of devices, e.g., [BRG+16,
MGP15, PP14]. The general idea in those works was to create two independent weak random sources from
devices (under different additional setup assumptions not made in [CSW14]) that violate some Bell inequality,
and then to apply a two-source extractor to get a final uniform key. However, as two-source extractors are
not secure against general quantum adversaries the security was compromised. Indeed, [MGP15, PP14] for
example did not give a complete security proof against quantum adversaries. In [BRG+16] security was
proven9 by a reduction to the case of a simple classical adversary (and hence the extractor could be used),
at the cost of an additional setup assumption, namely that the adversary never has access to the initial weak
source, and some loss in parameters.
Following the current work about quantum-proof multi-source extractors it is therefore interesting to
consider the Markov model in the context of QRA protocols. More specifically, one can assume that two
(or more) separated devices are a priori in product and become correlated only via the adversary or the
environment, i.e., the state of the devices and the adversary ρABC is a Markov chain A ↔ C ↔ B. The
(unknown but local) measurements in the two devices then create a ccq-state ρX1X2C in the Markov model,
to which the quantum-proof two-source extractor is applied.
Such assumptions about the structure of the devices could be justified in an intermediate device indepen-
dent manner, e.g., if the devices are produced by two different experimental groups, or if the experimentalists
know that a priori the devices are in a product state but might get correlated since they are placed in near
by locations and therefore effected from the same temperature fluctuations. In any case, we still consider
one quantum adversary and do not restrict her side information to some leakage operation as in [CLW14].
Furthermore, it is well known that for many Bell inequalities, if the observed Bell violation in the QRA
8The advantage of this approach is that this stronger notion of security allows for some inevitable unknown imperfections
in actual implementations of the protocol.
9The security proof of [BRG+16] holds against non-signalling adversaries, which are more powerful than quantum ones. Note
that two-source extractors are not known to be secure against those more powerful non-signalling adversaries (in any model of
the sources and the side information). Furthermore, our proof technique that shows security in specific quantum models cannot
be used in the non-signalling case.
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protocol is maximal then the devices must be in product with one another (i.e., one does not need to assume
that this is the case). Taking into account self-testing results like [RUV13, YVB+14], although out of reach
of current techniques, it is possible that in the future one could justify an almost tensor product structure
(in some appropriate notion of closeness under which the extractors still perform well) from a non-maximal
observed Bell violation.
8 Conclusions and open questions
In this work a new and natural model for classical and quantum-proof multi-source extractors was defined—
the Markov model. We then showed that all multi-source extractors, weak and strong, are also secure in
the presence of side information that falls into the Markov model, both in the classical and quantum case.
As explained in the previous sections, our main result, Theorem 2, can be seen as a continuation, extension
and improvement of previously known results [KK10, CLW14].
Apart from the result itself, on the technical level, a new proof technique was used, which, in contrast to
the previous works is indifferent to whether the extractors are strong or not. In particular this implies that
no adaptations are required for any new multi-source extractor that might be proposed in the future.
We finish this work with several open questions:
1. Are there more general models that extend the Markov model in which all extractors remain secure?
Some natural extensions were provided in Section 5.
2. Are there different families of states ρX1X2C from which it is possible to extract randomness that are
relevant for practical applications? The difficulty in extracting randomness comes from the fact that
we are not given one (known) state ρX1X2C , but that the extractor is expected to work for any state in
a given family, e.g., a Markov state with lower bounds on the conditional min-entropy. The standard
criterion of independence between the sources X1 and X2 has been relaxed in this work to allow for
sources that are independent conditioned on C. Other structures might also allow randomness to be
extracted.
3. What happens if the sources and the side information are not exactly in the Markov model but only
close to it? Even in the case of only two sources, there are different ways to quantify the closeness of a
state to a Markov-chain state (see, e.g., [FR15]). It is interesting to ask which notion of approximation
is relevant in applications of multi-source extractors (such as quantum randomness amplification)
and under which such notions the quantum-proof extractors remain secure. Note that the recovery
map notion of approximation of Markov chains [FR15] does not guarantee approximate conditional
independence of the sources, and seems to provide quite a different structure.
4. It is unclear whether Theorem 2 is tight, i.e., whether the loss in the error of the extractor is inevitable
when considering arbitrary extractors. In other words, it is not known if there are multi-source extrac-
tors for which the
√
2m loss in the error term is necessary10. In the other direction, as already noted
in Section 6.1, the work of [HT15] can be used, in combination with our proof technique, to show that
for two-universal hashing (when the seed is taken to be the second source) the blow-up in the error
term is not necessary.
5. Do multi-source extractors remain secure also in the presence of non-signalling side information? Non-
signalling adversaries are in general more powerful than quantum ones. For seeded extractors this does
not seem to be the case [HRW09, AFTS12] but for multi-source extractors nothing is known. Note
however that our proof technique is not applicable to non-signalling side information.
10The same question arises in the case of seeded extractors as well [BFS14, BFS16].
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Appendices
A Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 11. Let ρX1X2C =
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ |x2〉〈x2|ρC(x1, x2). Then there exists a pure state ρABC and
POVMs {Fx1}, {Gx2} such that
ρC(x1, x2) = TrAB
[
F
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1CρABCF
1
2
x1 ⊗G
1
2
x2 ⊗ 1C
]
.
Proof. Let ρX1X2C =
∑
x1,x2
px1,x2 |x1〉〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉〈x2|X2 ⊗ ρ˜x1,x2C , where ρ˜x1,x2C = ρC(x1,x2)TrρC(x1,x2) . And let
|ψx1,x2〉RC be a purification of ρ˜x1,x2C . We define
|ρ〉ABC =
∑
x1,x2
√
px1,x2 |x1〉X1 ⊗ |x2〉X2 ⊗ |ψx1,x2〉RC
with A = X1 and B = X2R. One can easily verify that this lemma holds for Fx1 = |x1〉〈x1| and Gx2 =
|x2〉〈x2| ⊗ 1R.
Lemma 13. For any ΨABC1C2 and positive operators {Fx1}, {Gx2}, {Hz1}, {Kz2} which sum up to the
identity,
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(z1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]
=
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2 ]−
1
M
Proof. Let p(x1, x2, z1, z2) = Tr [ΨABC1C2Fx1 ⊗Gx2 ⊗Hz1 ⊗Kz2]. We consider each of the terms of the
LHS of the equation separately:∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=yδExt(z1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
∑
x1,x2,z1,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(z1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) ;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=y p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
δExt(z1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M2
∑
x1,x2,
z1,z2,y
p(x1, x2, z1, z2) =
1
M
.
The lemma follows by combining all the terms.
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In the following we denote [l] \ {i} by i¯ and [l] \ {i, j} by {i, j}.
Lemma 32. Let ρA[l]C be such that for all i ∈ [l],
I(Ai : Ai¯|C) = 0 .
Then ρA[l]C can be written as a direct sum of product states,
ρA[l]C =
⊕
t
p(t)ρtA1Ct1
⊗ · · · ⊗ ρtAlCtl ,
where HC =
⊕
tHCt1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HCtl .
Proof. We prove this lemmas by recursively applying the result from [HJPW04] given in Equation (12) on
the structure of quantum Markov chains. We will also use the following facts about conditional mutual
information:
1. For any ρABC , I(A : B|C) ≥ 0.
2. For any ρABCD, I(A : BC|D) ≥ I(A : B|D).
3. For any ρABCX =
∑
x pxρ
x
ABC ⊗ |x〉〈x| classical on X , I(A : B|CX) =
∑
x pxI(A : B|CX = x).
Because I(A1 : A1¯|C) = 0, we know that
ρA[l]C =
⊕
t1
pt1ρ
t1
A1C
t1
1
⊗ ρt1
A1¯C
t1
1¯
.
Let T1 denote a classical system defined by
ρA[l]CT1 =
⊕
t1
pt1ρ
t1
A1C
t1
1
⊗ ρt1
A1¯C
t1
1¯
⊗ |t1〉〈t1| .
Note that ρA[l]CT1 is related to ρA[l]C by an isometry from C to CT1, hence
I(A2 : A2¯|CT1) = I(A2 : A2¯|C) = 0 .
It follows that for all t1,
I(A2 : A2¯|CT1 = t1) = 0 ,
and hence
I(A2 : A{1,2}|CT1 = t1) = 0 ,
which means that the state ρt1A2A{1,2}Ct1
is a Markov chain A2 ↔ Ct1 ↔ A{1,2}. Applying Equation (12)
again, we get
ρt1A2A{1,2}Ct1
=
⊕
t2
pt2ρ
t1,t2
A2C
t1,t2
2
⊗ ρt1,t2
A
{1,2}
C
t1,t2
{1,2}
.
Repeating this for all i ∈ [l] proves the lemma.
B Strong extractors
In this section we give the proofs necessary for the security of quantum-proof two-source extractors, strong
in the source X1, against product side information. The same steps can be repeated to prove the same result
for multi-source extractors which are strong with respect to other sources.
The following lemma is the analogues of Lemma 12 for the strong case.
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Lemma 33. Let ρX1X2C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 be a product ccq-state. Then there exists a POVM {Gz2} acting
on C2 such that
1
M
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖2 ≤∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(x1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
P[X1 = x1] TrC2 [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ] ,
where M = 2m.
Proof. First, recall that for a hermitian matrix R we have ‖R‖ = max{Tr[RS] : −1 ≤ S ≤ 1}. Applying
this to the matrix which norm specifies the error of the extractor, we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ = max−1≤S≤1Tr
[(
ρExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC
)
S
]
.
Since ρExt(X1,X2)X1C and ρUm⊗ρX1C are block diagonal with respect to the outcome variable of the extractor
y, as well as to the classical variable x1, S can be assumed to be block diagonal as well. Using this and
inserting the expression for ρX1X2C in Equation (7) we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ = max−1≤Sy,x1≤1
∑
y,x1,x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ρC1(x1)⊗ ρC2(x2)Sx1,y] .
Let us denote Gx2 = ρ¯
− 12
C2
ρC2(x2)ρ¯
− 12
C2
with ρ¯C2 =
∑
x2
ρC2(x2). Then we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖
= max
−1≤Sy,x1≤1
∑
y,x1,x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr
[
(ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 1C1 ⊗Gx2 (ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sx1,y
]
= max
−1≤Sy,x1≤1
∑
y,x1
Tr
[
(ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 1C1 ⊗∆x1,y (ρC1(x1)⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sx1,y
]
where we used the abbreviation
∆y,x1 =
∑
x2
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
]
Gx2 .
We now denote
ρX1C1 =
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ ρC1(x1)
and find ρ
1
2
X1C1
=
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ ρC1(x1)
1
2 . Setting
∆y =
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ 1C1 ⊗∆y,x1 , Sy =
∑
x1
|x1〉〈x1| ⊗ Sy,x1
we find
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ = max−1≤Sy≤1
∑
y
Tr
[
ρ
1
2
X1C1
⊗ ρ¯
1
2
C2
∆yρ
1
2
X1C1
⊗ ρ¯
1
2
C2
Sy
]
.
The crucial observation is now that the sesquilinear form
(Ry)× (Ty) 7→
∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 R∗y (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Ty
]
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on block-diagonal matrices is positive semi-definite and hence fulfils the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Applying
this gives
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖2 ≤(∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y
])
·
(∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy
])
.
Since we have that the norm of Sy is bounded by one, the terms in the second sum satisfy
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 Sy
]
≤ Tr [ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2Sy] ≤ 1 .
Hence we arrive at
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
√
M
∑
y
Tr
[
(ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y (ρX1C1 ⊗ ρ¯C2)
1
2 ∆y
]
and expanding the definition of ∆y yields
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
√
M
∑
y,x1,x2,z2
TrC1 [ρC1(x1)]
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(x1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
Tr [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ] ,
and since Gz2 are positive operators summing up to the identity, the assertion is proven.
Next, let p(x1, x2, z2) = P[X1 = x1] TrC2 [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ] and note that p(x1, x2, z2) is indeed a probability
distribution. Then, the following lemma is analogues to Lemma 13.
Lemma 34. For p(x1, x2, z2) = P[X1 = x1] TrC2 [ρC2(x2)Gz2 ],
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
[
δExt(x1,x2)=y −
1
M
] [
δExt(x1,z2)=y −
1
M
]
p(x1, x2, z2) =
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2)− 1
M
(15)
Proof. We follow a similar line as in the proof of Lemma 13.∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=yδExt(x1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z2) =
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2) ;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
δExt(x1,x2)=y p(x1, x2, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
δExt(x1,z2)=y p(x1, x2, z2) =
1
M
;
1
M2
∑
x1,x2,
z2,y
p(x1, x2, z2) =
1
M
.
The quantity in Equation (15) can be seen as a simple distinguishing strategy of a distinguisher trying
to distinguish the output of the extractor from uniform given classical side information Z2 about the second
source X2 and the source X1. We can therefore relate it to the error of the strong extractor in the case of
classical side information, i.e., to Equation (2). This is shown in the following lemma, which is analogues to
Lemma 14.
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Lemma 35. Let Z2 denote the classical side information about the source X2.
11 Then∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2)− 1
M
≤ 1
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ .
Proof. Define the following random variables over {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2:
R = Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2 ; Q = Um ◦X1Z2 .
Let A⋆ = {(a1, a2, a3)∣∣a1 = Ext (a2, a3)} ⊆ {0, 1}m×{0, 1}n1 ×{0, 1}n2. Then, the probabilities that R and
Q assign to the event A⋆ are
R(A⋆) =
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2) ; Q(A⋆) = 1
M
Using the definition of the variational distance we therefore have
1
2
‖Ext(X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ = sup
A
‖R(A)−Q(A)‖
≥ R(A⋆)−Q(A⋆)
=
∑
x1,x2,z2|
Ext(x1,x2)=Ext(x1,z2)
p(x1, x2, z2)− 1
M
.
Finally, we combine the lemmas together to show that any strong classical-proof two-source extractor in
the Markov model is secure against product quantum side information as well. We follow similar steps to
those in the proof of Lemma 15.
Lemma 36. Any (k1, k2, ε)-strong classical-proof two-source extractor in the Markov model is a (k1, k2, ε
′)-
strong quantum-proof product two-source extractor with ε′ =
√
ε · 2(m−2), where m is the output length of the
extractor.
Proof. Let ρX1X2C = ρX1C1 ⊗ ρX2C2 be any state of two classical sources and product side information with
Hmin(X1|C1) ≥ k1 and Hmin(X2|C2) ≥ k2.
We can apply Lemmas 33, 34, and 35 to get the bound
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
√
M
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ . (16)
As it follows from the proofs of the previous lemmas that Z2 includes side information about X2 alone
(and there is no additional side information about X2, i.e., the quantum system C1 is just thrown away)
p(x1, x2, z2) = p(x1) · p(x2, z2), which implies:
1. The sources and the classical side information form a Markov chain X1 ↔ Z2 ↔ X2.
2. Hmin (X1|Z2) = Hmin (X1) ≥ Hmin (X1|C1).
3. Hmin (X2|Z2) ≥ Hmin (X2|C2).
Hence, if Hmin (Xi|Ci) ≥ ki then by the definition of a strong classical-proof two-source extractor,
1
2
‖Ext (X1, X2)X1Z2 − Um ◦X1Z2‖ ≤ ε . (17)
Combining Equations (16) and (17) we get
1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUm ⊗ ρX1C‖ ≤
1
2
√
Mε =
√
ε2(m−2) .
11There is no side information about the source X1, since it is made available in full.
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C Extracting from subnormalized states
Extractors are usually defined for normalized states ρX1X2C . In applications one might wish to extract
from subnormalized states—for example, the smooth min-entropy of a state is a bound on the entropy of a
subnormalized state that is close by. Here we prove that if a function is an extractor (for normalized states),
then one can use it to extract from subnormalized states as well. We write up the lemma and proof in the
case of two-source extractors in the Markov model. Similar statements hold for multiple sources as well as
seeded extractors.
Lemma 37. Let σX1X2C be a subnormalized quantum Markov state satisfying Hmin(X1|C)σ ≥ k1 as well
as Hmin(X2|C)σ ≥ k2, and let Ext : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m be a (k1 − 1, k2 − 1, ε) quantum-proof
two-source extractor in the Markov model. If Ext is weak, then we have that
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖ ≤ 2ε .
If Ext is strong in Xi, then we have that
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)XiC − ρUm ⊗ σXiC‖ ≤ 2ε .
Proof. We prove the weak case. The proof for strong extractors is identical.
Define p = Tr[σC ] and with that the normalized state σˆX1X2C =
1
pσX1X2C as well as the auxiliary
normalized state
σ˜X1X2CP = σX1X2C ⊗ |0〉〈0|P + (1− p)τX1X2 ⊗ σˆC ⊗ |1〉〈1|P ,
where τX1X2 is the fully mixed state. Note that X1 ↔ CP ↔ X2 is a Markov chain for the state σ˜X1X2CP .
This state satisfies slightly modified min-entropy conditions:
pguess(X1|CP )σ˜X1CP = pguess(X1|C)σX1C + (1− p)pguess(X1|C)τX1⊗σˆC = 2−k1 + (1 − p)2−n1 ≤ 2 · 2−k1 .
Hence Hmin(X1|CP )σ˜ ≥ k1 − 1, and the same argument can also be carried out for X2 showing that
Hmin(X2|CP )σ˜ ≥ k2 − 1. The state σ˜X1X2CP is thus a valid Markov state satisfying the min-entropy
conditions and hence we have
1
2
‖σ˜Ext(X1,X2)CP − ρUm ⊗ σ˜CP ‖ ≤ ε .
But since the partial trace over the P system only decreases the trace distance, we infer that
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC + (1− p)τExt(X1,X2) ⊗ σˆC − (1− p)ρUm ⊗ σˆC‖ ≤ ε .
Thus starting from the expression ‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖ and then adding and subtracting the term
(1− p)[τExt(X1,X2) ⊗ σˆC − ρUm ⊗ σˆC ] as well as applying the triangle inequality leaves us with
1
2
‖σExt(X1,X2)C − ρUm ⊗ σC‖ ≤ ε+
1− p
2
‖τExt(X1,X2) ⊗ σˆC − ρUm ⊗ σˆC‖ ≤ 2ε ,
since τX1X2 ⊗ σˆC is a Markov source satisfying the entropic constraints.
D Composing two-source and seeded extractors
If a multi-source extractor is strong in an input X1, then the output Y is independent from X1. This can
be interpreted as Y containing the entropy from X2; the randomness of X1 served only as a catalyst, but
is still contained in that random variable. A very common technique used to extract that randomness is to
use another extractor. Since Y is uniform and independent from X1, it fulfils the conditions needed to use
it as a seed in seeded extractor. This is formalised in the following lemma.
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Lemma 38. Let Ext : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}d be a quantum-proof (k1, k2, ε)-two-source extractor strong
in the first input. And let Ext′ : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a quantum-proof (k1, ε′)-seeded extractor.
Then the function
Ext′′ : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}m
(x1, x2) 7→ Ext′(x1,Ext(x1, x2)),
is a quantum-proof (k1, k2, ε+ ε
′)-two-source extractor.
Proof. Let ρUdX1C = ρUd ⊗ ρX1C , where ρUd is a fully mixed state of dimension 2d. And let ρExt′(X1,Ud)C
denote the state resulting from applying Ext′ to X1 with Ud as seed. From the triangle inequality and
contractivity of the trace distance we have
1
2
‖ρExt′(X1,Ext(X1,X2))C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 1
2
‖ρExt′(X1,Ext(X1,X2))C − ρExt′(X1,Ud)C‖+
1
2
‖ρExt′(X1,Ud)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖
≤ 1
2
‖ρExt(X1,X2)X1C − ρUd ⊗ ρX1C‖+
1
2
‖ρExt′(X1,Ud)C − ρUm ⊗ ρC‖ .
The first term above is the error of Ext and the second is the error of Ext′.
Note that Lemma 38 only requires a weak seeded extractor. Hence if a strong extractor is used, the seed
can additionally be appended to the output—this is the case for all the following extractors.
Here below we give several seeded quantum-proof extractor constructions—all variants of Trevisan’s
extractor—that we use in the explicit constructions from Section 6.
The first construction [DPVR12, Corollary 5.3] is one for which the exact parameters have been calcu-
lated [MPS12].
Lemma 39 ([DPVR12, Corollary 5.3],[MPS12]). There exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m, which is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with
t = 2 log
2nm2
ε2
,
a = 1 +max
{
0,
log(m− e)− log(t− e)
log e− log(e − 1)
}
,
k = m+ 4 log
m
ε
+ 6 ,
d = at2 ,
where e is the mathematical constant.
The entropy loss of this extractor, k −m = 4 log mε + 6, can be reduced by composing it with an almost
universal hash function [TSSR11].
Lemma 40 ([DPVR12, Corollary 5.4]). There exists an explicit function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m,
which is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with k = m+ 4 log 1ε +O(1) and d = O(log
2 n
ε logm).
For ε = n−Ω(1) in Lemma 40 we get d = O(log3 n).
The final construction we consider only requires a seed of length O(log n), but can only extract a sublinear
amount of entropy.
Lemma 41 ([DPVR12, Corollary 5.6]). For any constant 0 < γ < 1 there exists an explicit function Ext :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, which is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor with k = nγm+8 log mε +O(1),
d = O(log n) and ε = n−Ω(1).
For example, if k = nα in Lemma 41 for γ < α ≤ 1, then m = nα−γ − o(1) = k1− γα − o(1).
28
References
[AFTS12] Rotem Arnon-Friedman and Amnon Ta-Shma. Limits of privacy amplification against nonsignal-
ing memory attacks. Physical Review A, 86(6):062333, 2012.
[BFS14] Mario Berta, Omar Fawzi, and Volkher B. Scholz. Quantum-proof randomness extractors via
operator space theory. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.3563, 2014.
[BFS16] Mario Berta, Omar Fawzi, and Volkher B. Scholz. Quantum bilinear optimization. SIAM Journal
on Optimization, 26(3):1529–1564, 2016.
[BRG+16] Fernando G. S. L. Branda˜o, Ravishankar Ramanathan, Andrzej Grudka, Karol Horodecki, Micha l
Horodecki, Pawe l Horodecki, Tomasz Szarek, and Hanna Wojewo´dka. Realistic noise-tolerant
randomness amplification using finite number of devices. Nature Communications, 7:11345, April
2016.
[CLW14] Kai-Min Chung, Xin Li, and Xiaodi Wu. Multi-source randomness extractors against quantum
side information, and their applications. arXiv preprint arXiv:1411.2315, 2014.
[CSW14] Kai-Min Chung, Yaoyun Shi, and Xiaodi Wu. Physical randomness extractors: Generating
random numbers with minimal assumptions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1402.4797, 2014.
[CZ15] Eshan Chattopadhyay and David Zuckerman. Explicit two-source extractors and resilient func-
tions. In Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), volume 22, page 119,
2015.
[DEOR04] Yevgeniy Dodis, Ariel Elbaz, Roberto Oliveira, and Ran Raz. Improved randomness extraction
from two independent sources. In Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimiza-
tion. Algorithms and techniques, pages 334–344. Springer, 2004.
[DPVR12] Anindya De, Christopher Portmann, Thomas Vidick, and Renato Renner. Trevisan’s extractor
in the presence of quantum side information. SIAM Journal on Computing, 41(4):915–940, 2012.
[FR15] Omar Fawzi and Renato Renner. Quantum conditional mutual information and approximate
markov chains. Communications in Mathematical Physics, 340(2):575–611, 2015.
[GKK+07] Dmitry Gavinsky, Julia Kempe, Iordanis Kerenidis, Ran Raz, and Ronald De Wolf. Exponential
separations for one-way quantum communication complexity, with applications to cryptography.
In Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 516–
525. ACM, 2007.
[HJPW04] Patrick Hayden, Richard Jozsa, Denes Petz, and Andreas Winter. Structure of states which
satisfy strong subadditivity of quantum entropy with equality. Communications in mathematical
physics, 246(2):359–374, 2004.
[HRW09] Esther Ha¨nggi, Renato Renner, and Stefan Wolf. The impossibility of non-signaling privacy
amplification. arXiv preprint arXiv:0906.4760, 2009.
[HT15] Masahito Hayashi and Toyohiro Tsurumaru. More efficient privacy amplification with less random
seeds. In Information Theory (ISIT), 2015 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 1786–1790.
IEEE, 2015.
[ILL89] Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid A Levin, and Michael Luby. Pseudo-random generation from one-way
functions. In Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing,
pages 12–24. ACM, 1989.
29
[KK10] Roy Kasher and Julia Kempe. Two-source extractors secure against quantum adversaries, volume
6302 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 656–669. Springer, 2010.
[KT08] Robert T. Konig and Barbara M. Terhal. The bounded-storage model in the presence of a
quantum adversary. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 54(2):749–762, 2008.
[Li15a] Xin Li. Improved constructions of two-source extractors. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 26th
Annual Conference on Computational Complexity (CCC), 2015. arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.01115.
[Li15b] Xin Li. Personal communication, 2015.
[Li15c] Xin Li. Three-source extractors for polylogarithmic min-entropy. In Proceedings of the 2015
IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 863–882,
2015. arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.02286.
[MGP15] Piotr Mironowicz, Rodrigo Gallego, and Marcin Pawlowski. Amplification of arbitrarily weak
randomness. Physical Review A, 91(032317), 2015. arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.7722.
[MPS12] Wolfgang Mauerer, Christopher Portmann, and Volkher B. Scholz. A modular framework for
randomness extraction based on trevisan’s construction. arXiv preprint arXiv:1212.0520, 2012.
[NC10] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum information. Cam-
bridge university press, 2010.
[PP14] Martin Plesch and Matej Pivoluska. Device-independent randomness amplification with a single
device. Physics Letters A, 378(40):2938–2944, 2014.
[Rao09] Anup Rao. Extractors for a constant number of polynomially small min-entropy independent
sources. SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(1):168–194, 2009.
[Raz05] Ran Raz. Extractors with weak random seeds. In Proceedings of the 37th Symposium on Theory
of Computing, STOC ’05, pages 11–20. ACM, 2005.
[Ren08] Renato Renner. Security of quantum key distribution. International Journal of Quantum Infor-
mation, 6(01):1–127, 2008.
[RK05] Renato Renner and Robert Ko¨nig. Universally composable privacy amplification against quantum
adversaries. In Theory of Cryptography, pages 407–425. Springer, 2005.
[RTS00] Jaikumar Radhakrishnan and Amnon Ta-Shma. Bounds for dispersers, extractors, and depth-two
superconcentrators. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 13(1):2–24, 2000.
[RUV13] Ben W Reichardt, Falk Unger, and Umesh Vazirani. Classical command of quantum systems.
Nature, 496(7446):456–460, 2013.
[Sca13] Valerio Scarani. The device-independent outlook on quantum physics (lecture notes on the power
of Bell’s theorem). arXiv preprint arXiv:1303.3081, 2013.
[Sha02] Ronen Shaltiel. Recent developments in explicit constructions of extractors. Bulletin of the
EATCS, 77(67-95):10, 2002.
[SV86] Miklos Santha and Umesh V Vazirani. Generating quasi-random sequences from semi-random
sources. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 33(1):75–87, 1986.
[TCR10] Marco Tomamichel, Roger Colbeck, and Renato Renner. Duality between smooth min- and
max-entropies. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 56(9):4674–4681, 2010.
[TLGR12] Marco Tomamichel, Charles Ci Wen Lim, Nicolas Gisin, and Renato Renner. Tight finite-key
analysis for quantum cryptography. Nature Communications, 3:634, 2012.
30
[Tre01] Luca Trevisan. Extractors and pseudorandom generators. Journal of the ACM, 48(4):860–879,
2001.
[TSSR11] Marco Tomamichel, Christian Schaffner, Adam Smith, and Renato Renner. Leftover hashing
against quantum side information. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 57(8):5524–5535,
August 2011. A preleminary version appeared at ISIT 2010.
[Vaz87] Umesh V Vazirani. Strong communication complexity or generating quasi-random sequences
from two communicating semi-random sources. Combinatorica, 7(4):375–392, 1987.
[Win04] Andreas Winter. “Extrinsic” and “intrinsic” data in quantum measurements: Asymptotic convex
decomposition of positive operator valued measures. Communications in mathematical physics,
244(1):157–185, 2004.
[YVB+14] Tzyh Haur Yang, Tama´s Ve´rtesi, Jean-Daniel Bancal, Valerio Scarani, and Miguel Navascue´s.
Robust and versatile black-box certification of quantum devices. Physical review letters,
113(4):040401, 2014.
31
